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Terrorism Statutes Run Wild: Methamphetamine and Weapons
of Mass Destruction
In response to the growing number of clandestine methamphetamine
labs, some North Carolina prosecutors have expressed willingness to
charge individuals who operate methamphetamine labs under North
Carolina's "weapons of mass destruction" statute.1  This prosecutorial
practice reflects a disturbing nationwide trend among some prosecutors to
apply newly-enacted anti-terrorism statutes to common, domestic crimes in
order to obtain more severe punishments.2  Although there may be
arguments that applying the North Carolina weapons of mass destruction
statute to the manufacturing of methamphetamine is impermissible per se,3
this Recent Development takes a more modest approach. This Recent
Development argues that, even if applying the statute in this manner is
permissible in principle, its retroactive application is unconstitutional
because it deprives defendants of their due process right to fair warning.
Although this analysis focuses specifically on a North Carolina statute,
markedly similar statutes exist in other states and are just as susceptible to
manipulation as the one examined here.4
In Bouie v. City of Columbia,' the United States Supreme Court first
articulated the principle that a deprivation of the right of fair warning
embodied in the Due Process Clause may result, not only from vague
statutory language, but also from "an unforeseeable and retroactive judicial
expansion of narrow and precise statutory language."6 Bouie arose in the
1. See David Ingram, Forsyth DA will Also Try New Anti-Terrorism Statute to Fight Meth
Labs, WINSTON-SALEM J., July 20, 2003, at B 1; Jim Sparks, Watauga Takes Aim at Spread of
Drug, WINSTON-SALEM J., Sept. 10, 2003, at Al. The statute makes it unlawful to "knowingly
manufacture, assemble, possess, store, transport [or] sell ... a nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapon." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.21(a) (2003). The term "nuclear, biological, or chemical
weapon" is defined, in pertinent part, as "any weapon, device, or method that is designed or has
the capability to cause death or serious injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of
[t]oxic or poisonous chemicals, or their immediate precursors;" or as "[a]ny substance that is
designed or has the capability to cause death or serious injury and ... [i]s or contains toxic or
poisonous chemicals or their immediate precursors." Id. § 14-288.21(c). A person convicted
under the statute is guilty of a Class B I felony which carries a penalty of twelve years to life
imprisonment. Id. § 14-288.21(d); Id. § 15A-1340.17(c).
2. See Siobhan Roth, Anti-Terror Laws Increasingly Used Against Ordinary Criminals,
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 11, 2003, at 4.
3. For instance, one could argue that application of the statute in this context violates
various rules of statutory construction.
4. See infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
5. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
6. Id. at 352.
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context of a civil rights sit-in where the defendants were charged with
criminal trespass when they refused to leave a lunch counter at an Eckerd's
drug store after being asked to leave.7 The Supreme Court held that the
courts could not construe the criminal trespass statute, which forbadeC'entry upon the lands of another' " after the owner has given notice that
entry is prohibited to cover the "act of remaining on the premises of
another after receiving notice to leave."'  The Court analogized to the
classic void-for-vagueness doctrine,9 which likewise derives from the Due
Process Clause, but also relied on the fact that this judicial enlargement of
the statute operated "precisely like an ex post facto law."1 The Court
noted that, "[i]f a state legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause
from passing such a law, it must follow that a State Supreme Court is
barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same result
by judicial construction."'"
The current Court significantly narrowed the scope of Bouie in Rogers
v. Tennessee12 yet left unclear the precise boundaries of the rule. Rogers
involved, not the judicial expansion of a statute, but rather the "retroactive
application of a judicial decision abolishing the common law 'year and a
day rule.' ",13 The Court noted that, because the Ex Post Facto Clause, by
its own terms, applies only to legislatures, the Bouie doctrine rests squarely
within the Due Process Clause and its guarantees of fair warning.14 It
therefore noted that, to the extent that the Bouie decision seemed to rely on
the Ex Post Facto Clause, that language was "dicta."' 5 Thus, the Bouie
doctrine did not incorporate "jot-for-jot" the specific categories of cases to
which the Ex Post Facto Clause applies.16 In justifying this conclusion the
7. Id. at 348.
8. Id. at 349-50 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-386 (1952) (Cum. Supp. 1960)).
9. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (voiding a state
vagrancy statute because it failed to give a person of normal intelligence fair notice of what
conduct it proscribed).
10. See Bouie, 378 U.S. at 353-54.
11. Id. In a subsequent case the Court further expanded the Bouie principle to apply, not
only to statutes that are narrow and precise, but to statutes that are broad and sweeping as well.
Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 195 (1977). "Ex post facto" simply means "after the fact."
12. 532 U.S. 451 (2001).
13. Id. at 453. Under the year and a day rule, a defendant could not be convicted of murder
if the victim died more than a year and a day after the defendant's act. See id.
14. Id. at 456.
15. Id. at 459.
16. Id. The categories to which the Court refers were first enunciated by Justice Chase in
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798) (seriatim opinion of Chase, J.):
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was
innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a
crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the
punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when
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Court stressed the institutional differences between common law judicial
functions and legislative lawmaking functions. 7 The Court reasoned that
"incorporation of the Calder categories into due process limitations on
judicial decisionmaking would place an unworkable and unacceptable
restraint on normal judicial processes and would be incompatible with the
resolution of uncertainty that marks an evolving legal system."' 8  The
Rogers Court stressed that this rationale was especially applicable to
common law doctrine and held that "a judicial alteration of a common law
doctrine of criminal law violates the principle of fair warning, and hence
must not be given retroactive effect, only where it is 'unexpected and
indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the
conduct in issue.' 19
For present purposes, the Rogers decision left three relevant questions
open: whether the Bouie doctrine applies to after-the-fact increases in
punishment for conduct that was previously criminal, and whether the
applicable test is the "unexpected and indefensible" test articulated in
Rogers and, if so, how that test operates.
Each of the cases in which the Supreme Court has applied the Bouie
principle has involved judicial interpretation that criminalized previously
innocent conduct.2" Thus, it is not clear whether the Bouie principle applies
at all to after-the-fact increases in punishment,2' especially since the
principle does not necessarily offer protections coextensive with the Ex
Post Facto Clause. Most circuit courts that have addressed the issue have
committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or
different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense,
in order to convict the offender. (emphasis added)
17. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 460.
18. Id. at461.
19. Id. at 462 (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964)). The Rogers
rationale and result have evoked some criticism. See id. at 467-81 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See
generally Heyward D. Armstrong, Comment, Rogers v. Tennessee: An Assault on Legality and
Due Process, 81 N.C. L. REV. 317 (2002) (arguing that Rogers unjustifiably limited the
constitutional protections of criminal defendants); Daniel James White, Casenote, Ex Post Facto
Excepted: Rogers v. Tennessee and the Permissible Retroactive Application of Judge Made Law,
71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1141 (2002) (examining and critiquing the rationale of Rogers and suggesting
its possible consequences).
20. See Rogers, 532 U.S. at 451 (involving retroactive application of a decision abolishing
the year and a day rule); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 188 (1977) (involving the
transportation of materials not defined as obscene under the pornography law as it existed at the
time of the acts); Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 348 (1964) (involving the retroactive
expansion of a trespass statute).
21. See Dale v. Haeberlin, 878 F.2d 930, 934 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting lack of clarity in
Bouie).
22. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 459.
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concluded that Bouie extends to after-the-fact increases in punishment; 3
however, each of these cases was decided before Rogers and in all of them
the courts relied heavily on the ex post facto language from Bouie.24 The
discussion in Davis v. Nebraska25 is representative. After citing Bouie for
the proposition that unforeseeable judicial expansion of a statute operates
like an ex post facto law, the court concluded that, because after-the-fact
increases in punishment are forbidden by the Ex Post Facto Clause, they
likewise must be forbidden by the Due Process Clause under Bouie. 6 The
rationale in these cases has certainly been undercut by the conclusion in
Rogers that the Bouie principle does not incorporate wholesale the
restrictions embodied in the Ex Post Facto Clause.27
Rogers, however, may be distinguishable. In limiting the applicability
of the Bouie principle, the Rogers Court stressed the need for flexibility
inherent in a common law legal system. The Court noted that restrictive
limitations on the abilities of the courts to mold the law could hamper the
evolution of the common law. 28 This proposition is undoubtedly correct,
but it does not follow that courts require the same flexibility when
interpreting statutes. To the contrary, in areas of law that are largely
statutory, it is the province of the legislature to change and refine the law.29
Therefore, in the statutory context, the judiciary does not require, nor
should it even exercise, the flexibility that the Rogers court sought to
secure for common law courts.
Even if Rogers did foreclose the possibility of direct analogy to the
categories of lawmaking prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause, an
argument based upon the general principles of fair warning incorporated in
23. See Johnson v. Kindt, 158 F.3d 1060, 1063 (10th Cir. 1998); Davis v. Nebraska, 958
F.2d 831, 834 (8th Cir. 1992); Helton v. Fauver, 930 F.2d 1040, 1045 (3d Cir. 1991); Haeberlin,
878 F.2d at 934. Only the Ninth Circuit has expressly held that the Bouie principle does not
apply to after-the-fact increases in punishment. Holgerson v. Knowles, 309 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th
Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Newman, 203 F.3d 700, 703 (9th Cir. 2000)). The Fifth
Circuit has not directly ruled on the issue but has indicated that whether the conduct was
previously lawful is a significant factor. See Janecka v. Cockrell, 301 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir.
2002).
24. See, e.g., Kindt, 158 F.3d at 1062-63 (relying heavily on Bouie's language regarding the
parallels between ex post facto restrictions on legislatures and due process limitations on courts);
Helton, 930 F.2d at 1045 (same).
25. 958 F.2d 831 (8th Cir. 1992).
26. Id. at 833-34.
27. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451,459 (2001).
28. Id. at 461.
29. Justice Antonin Scalia is one of the primary proponents of the view that the flexibility of
judicial decisionmaking in the common law tradition is undesirable when courts are interpreting
statutes. For a thorough discussion of his views on this subject and powerful critiques of his
argument as applied to constitutional interpretation, see generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
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the Due Process Clause could be persuasive as well.3" The Sixth Circuit's
opinion in Dale v. Haeberlin3" is instructive on this point. Though the
court relied in part on the language in Bouie regarding the Ex Post Facto
Clause in holding that the Bouie principle applied to after-the-fact increases
in punishment,32 it also rested its decision on general notions of fair
warning. Noting that the foundation of the "fair warning" requirement
assumes the person committing the act is rational, the court said,
"[p]rinciples of fairness ... require that this actor, in making his decision
whether to act, be fully informed as to whether this proposed action is
criminal, and, if so, what type of punishment one guilty of the criminal act
can expect."33
The deterrence theory of punishment supports this view. The rationale
behind deterrence rests on the notion that imposing a greater punishment
for a particular act will deter more people from committing that act.34 To
the extent that deterrence theory retains force in our society as a viable
purpose of punishment,35 society expects individuals to mold their behavior
according to the severity of the crime. Therefore, principles of fairness
require individuals to know the potential consequences of their criminal
actions. One could argue that the degree of punishment for any given
crime is often flexible and depends upon the discretion of those working
within the criminal justice system. Thus, the degree of punishment is never
foreseeable in a particular case. In this age of structured sentencing,
however, punishments for crimes are finely graded and the discretion
within the system has been substantially reduced.36 Consequently, the
30. See Rogers, 532 U.S. at 459 (noting that Bouie is applied "in accordance with the more
basic and general principle of fair warning").
31. 878 F.2d 930 (6th Cir. 1989).
32. See id. at 933-34.
33. Id. at 934-35.
34. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 1.5(a)(4) (West
Publishing Co. 1986) (1972).
35. The theory of deterrence has its critics. See generally Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of
Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943 (2000) (arguing that pure deterrence
theory has failed to explain the reason for punishment and advancing a hybrid theory
incorporating principles from both deterrence and retribution); Dan M. Kahan, The Secret
Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARv. L. REV. 413 (1999) (contending that deterrence arguments
often hold little force in society). Other scholars have noted a recent trend away from deterrence
theory and towards retribution. See generally Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The
Resilience of Retribution as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1313 (2000) (arguing that, despite the efforts of utilitarian reformers in the mid-twentieth
century, retribution has firmly taken hold in both the courts and the legislatures).
36. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL passim (2002) (providing a
comprehensive system of classifying criminal acts according to the crime committed and certain
offense characteristics and a grid for calculating the permissible range of punishment); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 15A-1340.10 to .24 (2003) (codifying a similar system).
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severity of the punishment for particular crimes is in fact foreseeable.3 7
Furthermore, with respect to the relevant North Carolina statutes, the
difference in punishment between the weapons of mass destruction statute
and the statute directly prohibiting the manufacture of methamphetamine is
tremendous.3 s
Assuming that the Bouie principle applies to after-the-fact increases in
punishment, the question remains as to what test applies after Rogers.
Prior to Rogers, many courts interpreted the Bouie test as one of simple
foreseeability.39 Rogers, however, seemed to reinterpret Bouie as standing
for the proposition that only a retroactively applied judicial decision that is
both "unexpected and indefensible" violates the principles of fair warning
embodied in the Due Process Clause.' The specific holding of Rogers
established the "unexpected and indefensible" test only for judicial
alterations of the common law, but the Court suggested that it understood
Bouie to require the same analysis whenever a retroactively applied judicial
decision potentially implicates rights of fair warning.4 1 Furthermore, most
courts that have addressed the issue of retroactively applied judicial
decisions since Rogers have applied the "unexpected and indefensible" test
across the board.42 Therefore, it is highly likely that most courts will apply
37. One could argue that the general public is probably not aware of the prevalence of
structured sentencing laws. However, ignorance of the law is generally not an excuse from
liability. If an individual is not allowed to use her ignorance of the law as an excuse, the
government should not be able to either. See Posters 'N' Things, Ltd. v. United States, 511 U.S.
513, 524 (1994).
38. A person convicted under the "weapons of mass destruction" statute is guilty of a class
B 1 felony, which carries a penalty of twelve years to life imprisonment. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
288.2 1(d) (2003); Id. § 15A-1340.17(c). A person convicted under the statute directly addressing
methamphetamine is generally guilty of a class H felony which carries a penalty of four to
twenty-five months imprisonment. Id. § 90-90(3)(c); Id. § 90-95(b)(1); Id. § 15A-1340.17(c).
39. See, e.g., Johnson v. Kindt, 158 F.3d 1060, 1063 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The test for
determining whether the retroactive application of a judicial decision violates due process is
essentially one of foreseeability.") (citing McDonald v. Champion, 962 F.2d 1455, 1458 (10th
Cir. 1992)); McSherry v. Block, 880 F.2d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that the
determination is one of foreseeability).
40. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451,461-62 (2001).
41. See id. at 461. The Rogers Court stated that "Bouie restricted due process limitations on
the retroactive application of judicial interpretations of criminal statutes to those that are
,unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the
conduct in issue."' Id. (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964)). Though
the Rogers Court fails to note it, that particular language in Bouie was a quote from a treatise on
criminal law and probably was not intended to be the holding of the case. See Bouie, 378 U.S. at
354 (quoting JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 58-59 (The Bobbs-Merrill
Co. 1960) (1947)).
42. See Janecka v. Cockrell, 301 F.3d 316, 324 n.1 I (5th Cir. 2002); Willingham v. Mullin,
296 F.3d 917, 925 (10th Cir. 2002); State v. Redmond, 631 N.W.2d 501, 508 (Neb. 2001). But
see Hawkins v. Mullin, 291 F.3d 658, 665-66 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that if the statute is
"narrow and precise" on its face, any judicial expansion is per se unconstitutional; but if the
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the test articulated by Rogers in this context.
This conclusion raises the question of what exactly it means for a
judicial interpretation to be "unexpected and indefensible." The Rogers
holding offers some general guidance by noting that the interpretation must
be " 'unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been
expressed prior to the conduct at issue.' ""4 Most likely the Court
envisioned the application of this rule to common law doctrines and
statutes that had previously been interpreted and applied by the courts. In
such a situation, the reviewing court would simply compare the novel
interpretation with past interpretations. Because there has yet to be a
judicial opinion interpreting the North Carolina weapons of mass
destruction statute,' this method of analysis is unavailable in the present
case.
The manner in which the courts have applied the Rogers test offers
some guidance. The analysis in Rogers and the few cases that have applied
it suggest that, despite the re-articulation of the test, it is still based
primarily on principles of foreseeability, though perhaps requiring a higher
threshold showing of unforeseeability than that required pre-Rogers. s In
Rogers, the Court concluded that retroactive application of a judicial
decision abolishing the year and a day rule was not "unexpected and
indefensible" because the rule was widely viewed as outdated, it had been
abolished in most jurisdictions, and had never served as the basis of any
Tennessee decision.46 The judicial abolition of the "archaic and outdated"
year and a day rule was, therefore, not sufficiently unforeseeable to prevent
its retroactive application.47
Turning to the lower courts, the issue before the Tenth Circuit in
Hawkins v. Mullin48 was whether a judicial decision finding that
kidnapping for extortion could serve as a predicate felony under the state
felony murder statute where the statute only enumerated simple kidnapping
violated principles of fair warning.49 At the outset the court observed that
the determination was still essentially one of foreseeability. 0 In holding
that the defendant's rights were not violated, the court emphasized the
logical consequences of a decision in favor of the defendant. The court
statute is not "narrow and precise," the "unexpected and indefensible" test applies).
43. See Rogers, 532 U.S. at 461 (citing Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354
(1964)).
44. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.21 (2003).
45. See infra text accompanying notes 46-63.
46. Rogers, 532 U.S. at 462-64.
47. Id. at 467.
48. 291 F.3d 658 (10th Cir. 2002).
49. Id. at 664.
50. Id.
2148 [Vol. 82
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noted that such a finding would produce the illogical result that the lesser
offense of simple kidnapping could serve as the requisite predicate offense,
but the greater crime of kidnapping for extortion could not.5 It also noted
that the legislative policy underlying the felony murder statute, the
deterrence of felonies "so inherently dangerous as to create foreseeable
risks of death," is well-served by including kidnapping by extortion within
the predicate felonies. 2
The Tenth Circuit addressed retroactive increases in punishment again
in Willingham v. Mullin,53 in which it stated that the entire test "depends on
the merit or plausibility of [the court's] holding in light of the legal
principles and statutory language on which it was based."54 In Willingham,
the legislature had changed the elements for depraved mind murder to
include an element that malice murder, with which the defendant was
charged, did not require. The state court previously had not noticed the
amendment, but when it did, declined to include depraved mind murder as
a lesser included offense in the jury instruction.5 6  The defendant
challenged the failure to instruct on depraved mind murder on due process
grounds.57 The Tenth Circuit took a two-tiered approach to the test. While
it found the interpretation of the statute in question "unexpected," it
nevertheless held that it was not "indefensible."58 The interpretation of the
statute may have been unexpected by the defendant, but its application in
this case was imminently foreseeable based upon the statutory language.59
Thus, the court interpreted the Rogers test as two-pronged but nonetheless
made its final determination based upon principles of foreseeability, albeit
perhaps requiring a greater degree of foreseeability than it would have
before Rogers.
State courts have also interpreted the Rogers test as one of
foreseeability. The Connecticut Supreme Court applied the Rogers test in
State v. Miranda,6' in which the defendant was charged and convicted
under the state's assault statute for breaching his common law duty to come
to the aid of a child he considered his stepdaughter.6' Because no one had
ever been convicted under Connecticut's assault statute for failing to aid
51. Id. at 667.
52. Id.
53. 296 F.3d 917 (10th Cir. 2002).
54. Id. at 925.
55. Id. at 923.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 925-96.
59. Willingham, 296 F.3d at 925.
60. 794 A.2d 506 (Conn. 2002).
61. Id. at511.
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another, the defendant asserted a due process challenge.62 After quoting the
"unexpected and indefensible" test from Rogers, the court, like the Tenth
Circuit, set out to determine whether the trial court's application of the
statute was "foreseeable. 63
Like the Rogers Court, these lower courts have applied the
"unexpected and indefensible" test in terms of foreseeability, the same
principle that governed the analysis before Rogers was decided.' This
interpretation also comports with the right of fair warning upon which the
test is based.65 The Court's purpose in re-articulating the Bouie test was
then to draw a clear distinction between legislative and judicial lawmaking
and to require a greater showing of unforeseeability when challenging the
retroactive application of the latter. These principles guide the analysis of
the constitutionality of the retroactive application of North Carolina's
weapons of mass destruction statute to the manufacture of
methamphetamine. Close, contextual examination of the statutory
language reveals that the statute cannot be constitutionally applied in this
situation.
The weapons of mass destruction statute makes it unlawful to
"knowingly manufacture, assemble [or] possess ... nuclear, biological, or
chemical weapon[s] of mass destruction. 66 There are two definitions of
"weapon of mass destruction" within the statute that arguably apply to the
manufacturing of methamphetamine. The first is "[a]ny substance that is
designed or has the capability to cause death or serious bodily injury and
... contains toxic or poisonous chemicals or their immediate precursors."67
The second is "[a]ny weapon, device or method that is designed or has the
capability to cause death or serious injury through the release,
dissemination, or impact of ... [t]oxic or poisonous chemicals or their
immediate precursors."68 Read literally, these provisions could arguably
apply respectively to the possession and production of methamphetamine.
Methamphetamine is a highly toxic substance that can severely damage the
brain, induce strokes, and sometimes cause death. 69  The manufacturing
62. Id. at 510.
63. Id. at 515. The court concluded that the trial court's interpretation of the statute was
foreseeable, basing its decision primarily on the fact that the common law has long imposed a
duty to aid on those who live under one roof. Id. at 516-17.
64. But see State v. Redmond, 631 N.W.2d 501, 508 (Neb. 2001) (interpreting Rogers as
demanding an especially rigid, two-pronged test and upholding the retroactive application of a
judicial interpretation of statutory language solely on the basis that the decision had some
colorable legal support).
65. See Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451,459 (2001).
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.21(a) (2003).
67. Id. § 14 -288.21(c)(2) (emphasis added).
68. Id. § 14-288.21(c)(1) (emphasis added).
69. See ERROL YUDKO ET AL., METHAMPHETAMINE USE: CLINICAL AND FORENSIC
2150 [Vol. 82
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process itself involves highly volatile chemical reactions that pose
significant dangers both to those involved in producing the substance as
well as to investigating law enforcement officials.7" Moreover, each pound
of manufactured methamphetamine produces five pounds of toxic and
potentially lethal waste that can seep into groundwater and cause serious
health problems for those living in the surrounding community.7
Thus, a reading of the statutory definitions in isolation suggests that it
is foreseeable that those who manufacture methamphetamine could be
prosecuted under the weapons of mass destruction statute. Both
methamphetamine itself and the chemical processes involved in its
production fit within the literal statutory definition of a "weapon of mass
destruction."72 Viewing the statute as a whole, however, it becomes less
foreseeable that the statute could be so applied.
Under the "method" definition, the section referring to chemicals is
preceded by references to "radiation or radioactivity," and "disease
organism[s]."'73 Under the "substance" definition, the "chemical" section is
preceded and followed by similar references.74  The references to
radioactivity and disease organisms refer specifically to weapons such as
nuclear weapons, dirty bombs and anthrax-types of weapons associated
with terrorism and generally regarded as weapons of mass destruction. The
fact that the more expansive definition relating to chemicals is listed
alongside these specific references to nuclear and biological weapons
compels the inference that the chemical definition is properly limited to
those substances and weapons that one generally associates with terror
attacks.75 Upon reading the statute, one could reasonably foresee that the
ASPECTS 47-48 (CRC Press 2003).
70. H.R. REP. No. 106-878, at 22 (2000).
71. Id.
72. Because the statute criminalizes both manufacturing and possession, one anomalous
result of this reading is that those who simply possess a small amount of methamphetamine could
be subject to the same extreme penalties as those who manufacture it. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-
288.21(a) (2003). The courts could easily avoid this result, however, by finding that only the
definition regarding the "method," not the "substance," applies. Such an interpretation arguably
makes sense given the fact that it is only the manufacturing process that entails a high risk of
explosion and widespread environmental contamination.
73. Id. § 14-288.21(c)(1) ("Any weapon, device or method that is designed or has the
capability to cause death or serious injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of: (a)
Radiation or radioactivity; (b) A disease organism; or (c) Toxic or poisonous chemicals or their
immediate precursors.").
74. Id. § 14-288.21(c)(2) ("Any substance that is designed or has the capability to cause
death or serious injury and: (a) Contains radiation or radioactivity; (b) Is or contains toxic or
poisonous chemicals or their immediate precursors; or (c) Is or contains one or more of the
following [disease organisms]").
75. According to the canon of construction ejusdem generis, when a general term is followed
by more specific terms, the meaning of the general term should be limited to the scope of the
specific terms. See Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 403 n.2 (1998) (citing Norfolk &
2004] 2151
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chemical definition included substances such as napalm or agent orange.
But given the context of the definition, it is not foreseeable that the
definition covers methamphetamine, a drug, no matter how dangerous, that
is manufactured solely for personal consumption not violent terrorist
attacks.
Viewing the statute in light of North Carolina law as a whole, its
application to manufacturing methamphetamine becomes even more
unforeseeable. More than thirty years ago the General Assembly enacted
the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act, a comprehensive statutory
scheme designed to address directly the problem of the use, sale and
production of illegal drugs.76 The Controlled Substances Act specifically
defines methamphetamine as a Schedule II controlled substance and
contains other provisions detailing the severity of punishment for its sale
and production depending on the quantity of the drug.7 7 The existence of
well-established laws that specifically address methamphetamine leads one
to expect that those who deal in methamphetamine will be prosecuted
exclusively under those laws.78
An analysis of similar statutes in other jurisdictions confirms the
conclusion that retroactive application of the weapons of mass destruction
statute79 in this situation is unforeseeable. Congress and several states have
enacted laws similar to North Carolina's weapons of mass destruction
statute.8" Much of the language used in defining weapons of mass
destruction in those statutes is identical to that used in North Carolina's
statute. For instance, all of them target "the release, dissemination, or
impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals" and whether the chemicals can
Western Ry. Co. v. Train Dispatchers' Assoc., 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991)).
76. See North Carolina Controlled Substances Act, ch. 919, sec. 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws
1477, 1477 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-86 to 90-113.5 (2003)).
77. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-90(3)(c) (2003) (designating methamphetamine a Schedule II
controlled substance); Id. § 90-95(b)(1) (providing that possession, sale and manufacturing of
methamphetamine is normally a Class H felony); Id. § 90-95(h)(3b) (providing more severe
sentences based upon the quantity of the drug possessed, sold, or manufactured).
78. At the very least, the existence of a statute dealing directly with methamphetamine
proves that the General Assembly is fully able to draft a statute to address the problem directly. If
the General Assembly had intended the weapons of mass destruction statute to apply to
methamphetamine it would have explicitly done so.
79. Although it may seem that examining the law of other jurisdictions is not especially
relevant to the foreseeability determination, both the Rogers Court and the Connecticut Supreme
Court examined the state of the law in other jurisdictions. See supra notes 44, 61 and
accompanying text.
80. See 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (2000); ARIz. REV. STAT. §§ 13-2301 to -2308.01 (West Supp.
2003); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-3151 to -3156 (West Supp. 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.166




cause death or serious bodily harm.81 North Carolina's statutory definition
of a weapon of mass destruction is more expansive than those of other
jurisdictions in that it includes chemicals and methods that simply have the
capability of causing death or serious bodily harm, while most other
jurisdictions limit the definition to include only those chemicals that are
designed or otherwise intended to cause serious death or bodily harm.82
Despite these differences, there is substantial similarity between the
language used in the statutes, which gives rise to a compelling inference
that they were all passed with an eye towards addressing the same issues.83
Consequently, it is notable that the chapter or article title of many of these
statutes is "terrorism."'  These titles suggest that the purpose of these
statutes is to address, and provide serious penalties for, terrorist activities
rather than activities related to controlled substances.85
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the unforeseeability of
application of the North Carolina weapons of mass destruction statute to
those who manufacture methamphetamine. Moreover, the degree of
unforeseeability is sufficiently great to surpass even the heightened
standard implicit in the "unexpected and indefensible" test articulated by
the Rogers Court. There is no doubt that methamphetamine use and
production is a serious problem in our society. More serious penalties for
methamphetamine related crimes may very well be warranted.86 However,
81. See 18 U.S.C. 2332a(c)(2)(B); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-2301(C)(1 1)(a); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 2-3152(12)(c); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.166(1)(a)(1); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-710(19)(b); VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-46.4.
82. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.21(c)(1) ("Any weapon, device, or method that is
designed or has the capability to cause death or serious injury ...."), with 18 U.S.C.
§ 2332a(c)(2)(B) ("any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily
injury...."), and S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-710(19)(b) (same).
83. The fact that the North Carolina statute does not include an element of intent regarding
the dangerousness of the substance or method may not be as important as it seems. A person
convicted under the statute is guilty of a Class B 1 felony which carries a penalty of twelve years
to life imprisonment. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.21(d); Id. § 15A-1340.17(c). The greater the
possible punishment the more likely courts will read into the statute an element of intent. See,
e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994) (presuming a knowledge
requirement in a child pornography statute that carried a potential penalty of ten years); Staples v.
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 616-18 (1994) (imputing a requirement of knowledge in a firearm
statute that potentially exposed violators to ten years imprisonment).
84. See 18 U.S.C. § 2332a ("Terrorism"); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-3151 ("Terrorism"); VA.
CODE. ANN. § 18.2-46.4 ("Terrorism Offenses").
85. The fact that the North Carolina statute was enacted on Nov. 28, 2001, shortly after the
Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, further supports the view that it was intended to provide penalties for
those engaged in terrorist activities. See Act of Nov. 28, 2001, ch. 2001-470, sec. 1, 2001 N.C.
Sess. Laws 2565, 2565 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-288.21 (2003)).
86. In fact the General Assembly is considering bills which would significantly increase the
penalties for manufacturing methamphetamine. See Steve Hartsoe, Proposed Bills Target Meth,
Guns, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 29, 2004, at B5, available at
http://www.newsobserver.com/politics/politicians/legislature/story/1260790p-7377457c.htrnl (last
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retroactively applying broadly phrased anti-terrorism statutes to deal with
this problem violates the core due process guarantees that are the hallmark
of a fair criminal justice system.
0. DEAN SANDERFORD
visited Aug. 29, 2004) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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